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Abstract
This paper aims to address the empirical question of whether a country’s le-
vel of manufacturing trade is affected by its financial sector development and to
investigate the role of institutions in this relationship. Countries endowed with
better-developed financial systems tend to specialize in industries that rely on ex-
ternal finance in production. This effect is likely to be stronger in countries with
high-quality institutions. Using pure cross-sectional and panel specifications on a
sample of 75 countries over the period 1971-2010, we find that financial develop-
ment strongly and robustly exerts a positive effect on manufacturing exports, even
after controlling for the effect of banking crises. Furthermore, institutional quality
is found to have a favorable effect on the extent to which finance influences manu-
facturing trade, suggesting a multiplicity of experiences of the largest exporters
of manufactured goods.
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1. Introduction
Trade openness in the world’s “most open” and “least open” countries differs by a
factor of 16. Argentina, one of the “least open” economies, experienced a trade volume
(% of GDP) of 20% whereas Singapore, had 440% over the period 1971-2010. How can
these large differences in levels of trade openness across countries be explained ? At the
same time, the average level of financial sector development, measured by the domestic
credit to private sector (% of GDP), is more than 22 times higher in the most financially-
developed country (Japan) than in the least one (Ghana). 1 Are differences in financial
sector development importantly linked with differences in trade openness ? Figure 1 in
appendix shows that over the period 1971-2010, there was a positive association between
the financial sector development and the indicators of trade performance, which is stronger
between the ratio of domestic private credit and manufacturing exports. Does this prima
facie evidence of possible linkages between finance and trade suggest that countries with
better-developed financial sectors tend to have a comparative advantage in manufacturing
industries ? Does institutional quality matter in this relationship ?
The causes of the wide variation in trade openness between countries have been debated
by theorists of international trade. Traditional theory shows that these disparities are due
to cross-country differences in labor productivity and technology, as well as endowments of
land and capital. More recently, the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek multi-factor content theorem
predicts the net factor content of trade, which is the difference in goods’ factor content.
Countries endowed with relatively high-quality institutions tend to specialize in industries
that relatively rely more on the services provided by these institutions. Consistent with this
theorem, we consider financial system as an endowment and argue that the cross-country
disparities in trade performances might be influenced by differences in levels of financial
development. Even with identical technology and factor endowments between countries,
comparative costs may differ when countries differ in their domestic institutions of credit
enforcement. Since financial services provided by the domestic financial systems can be
immobile across countries, the pattern of industrial specialization should be influenced by
the level of financial intermediation.
The theoretical arguments that support this relationship can be traced back to the
1. Here, the world’s “most open” and “least open” countries are the top 1% and the bottom 99% of the
distribution of trade openness, respectively. The source of these data is the World Development Indicators
of the World Bank. These comparisons are based on data from a sample of 75 countries over the period
1971-2010. GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product.
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seminal work of Kletzer & Bardhan (1987) and Baldwin & Krugman (1989). They show
that capital market imperfections importantly determine the countries’ comparative ad-
vantage in trade. Recent theoretical developments have left no doubt on the relevance
of such a relationship between finance and international trade patterns (see for instance
Beck, 2002; Matsuyama, 2005; Wynne, 2005; Antras & Caballero, 2009; Manova, 2006). 2
Countries endowed with well developed financial systems tend to specialize in industries
that rely more on external finance in production. On the other hand, countries with less
developed financial systems tend to export goods not requiring external finance.
However, despite numerous attempts to empirically address this issue, there is little
persuasive evidence concerning the relationship between financial development and in-
ternational trade. While a number of studies find that international trade is driven by
financial development (see, for instance, Beck, 2002, 2003; Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2005;
Manova, 2006; Becker & Greenberg, 2007; Manova, 2008), a recent and expanding body
of work, however, finds evidence that the demand of a well developed financial sector is
higher in countries with industrial structures that heavily rely on external finance (see
for instance Huang & Temple, 2005; Klein & Olivei, 2008; Baltagi et al., 2009; Do &
Levchenko, 2007). In contrast, the demand for external finance will be lower in countries
that specialize in goods not requiring external finance. Furthermore, in this empirical
literature, with exception of Ju & Wei (2011), no emphasis has been placed on the im-
portance of institutions in the relationship between finance and trade. Ju & Wei (2011)
build upon a general equilibrium framework and argue that finance is passive in countries
with high-quality institutions and appears to be a source of comparative advantage in
countries with low-quality institutions. 3 In line with the recent and growing literature on
the relationship between finance, institutions, and growth (see for instance Claessens &
Laeven, 2003; Klein, 2005; Bose et al., 2012), we argue that in countries with high-quality
institutions, transactions in financial and goods markets are better cleared and settled
owing to better information and increased competition. In addition, when property rights
and shareholders are more secure, firms might have better governance and greater ef-
ficiency in production due to better resource allocation. Thus, the institutional quality
might reinforce the expected positive impact of financial development on international
2. While all of these studies consider financial development as exogenous, Do & Levchenko (2007)
suggest that financial development is an outcome of the demand for external finance and, therefore, is
endogenous.
3. Ju & Wei (2011) define the institutional quality by referring to the competitiveness of the financial
sector, the quality of corporate governance, and the level of property right protection.
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trade flows.
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study which empirically tackles
the issue of the effects of financial development on manufacturing trade by highlighting
the role of institutional quality in this relationship. We also overcome one of the major
shortcomings of the previous empirical work. We use an indicator of financial develop-
ment that helps capture differences in domestic financial system level and quality across
countries, namely the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP. Existing studies usually
use the credit to the private sector to GDP to proxy for financial sector development. Ho-
wever, the underlying rationale for the hypothesis that financial development is a source
of comparative advantage is that countries differ in their domestic institutions of credit
enforcement. It is therefore more appropriate to consider domestic private credit rather
than total private credit. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first
present an overview of the empirical findings on the finance-trade nexus. In Section 3, we
then present the empirical strategy and the data used. Section 4 provides and discusses
our main results and robustness tests, while Section 5 concludes and draws some policy
implications.
2. Related empirical results
A Growing body of empirical work demonstrates that financial development is positi-
vely and robustly linked to trade openness . The seminar work in this empirical literature
is by Beck (2002). By focusing on the mobilization of savings and the allocation of these
loanable funds, he uses the credit to the private sector by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions (% of GDP) as a proxy for financial development. Using data on 65
countries from 1966 to 1995, and after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse
causality, Beck (2002) finds that countries with a higher level of financial development ex-
perience higher shares of manufactured exports in GDP and in total merchandise exports
and have a higher trade balance in manufactured goods. Beck (2003) uses industry-level
data for 36 industries and 56 countries and focuses on the extent to which financial deve-
lopment translates into a comparative advantage in industries that rely more heavily on
external finance. He follows the technique developed by Rajan & Zingales (1998) and uses
data on the reliance on external finance across industries as well as different measures
6
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of financial sector development. 4 His results show that countries with better-developed
financial systems experience higher export shares and trade balances in industries that
use more external finance. One of the major weaknesses of these previous work is the use
of the ratio of private credit to GDP as the measure of financial sector development. This
indicator accords well when focusing on the finance-growth nexus. It is, however, less ap-
propriate when studying the relationship between financial development and international
trade. Indeed, the fundamental reason why financial sector development might be a source
of comparative advantage is that countries differ in their domestic institutions of credit
enforcement.
More recently, Svaleryd & Vlachos (2005) study the effects of financial factors the
pattern of industrial specialization and comparative advantage using data on financial
endowment from OECD countries. 5 Again, their results indicate that countries with well-
functioning financial systems tend to specialize in industries highly dependent on external
financing. Interestingly, these results also show that differences in financial systems are
more important determinants of the pattern of specialization between OECD countries
than differences in human capital. Using data on bilateral exports from 107 countries
and 27 sectors over the period 1985-1995, Manova (2006) provides evidence that credit
constraints importantly determine international trade flows. Financially developed coun-
tries are more likely to export bilaterally and ship greater volumes when they become
exporters. Industries that rely more on outside finance in production or that employ fewer
collateralizable assets are more likely to enjoy greater this effect than other industries.
Elsewhere, it is clear from these results that in financially vulnerable industries, countries
with better-developed financial systems export a wider variety of products and experience
less product turnover in their exports over time. Additionally, financially developed coun-
tries experience more trading partners and export to smaller import markets, especially
in financially vulnerable sectors. Manova (2008) focus on the effects of equity market li-
beralizations on trade flows by exploiting shocks to the availability of external finance
using data from 91 countries over the period 1980-1997. The results of this study mainly
indicate that equity market liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in
financially vulnerable industries that require more external finance or use fewer collate-
4. Rajan & Zingales (1998) show that industries relying more heavily on external finance grow faster in
countries with a better-developed financial system, suggesting that financially developed countries should
have a comparative advantage in industries relying more on external finance.
5. OECD stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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ralizable assets. These effects are more pronounced in countries with initially less active
stock markets.
Furthermore, some recent work has extended this issue on the relationship between
finance and trade by focusing symmetrically on the effects of financial crisis on interna-
tional trade (see for instance Ronci, 2004; Iacovone & Zavacka, 2009; Chor & Manova,
2010). Their findings indicate that financial crises exert an important negative effect on
international trade flows. This can be explain by three main alternative, but not mutually
exclusive, reasons, namely the sunk costs of entering into foreign markets, the problem of
access to trade credit, and the “demand-side” shocks owing to the negative effect of finan-
cial crisis on economic growth. In this empirical literature, no emphasis has been placed
on the importance of institutions in the relationship between financial sector development
and international.
3. Empirical approach
3.1. Econometric analysis : strategy and issues
Do differences in trade performance strongly associated with differences in financial
sector development ? To understand the effects of finance on the pattern of trade we
estimate the following regression :
Tradeit = α + β1 ∗ Financeit + β2 ∗Xit + µi + γt + it (1)
where Tradeit is the measure of trade performance and Financeit is the proxy for finan-
cial sector development for the country i in period t. X represents a set of conditioning
information to control for other factors associated with trade performance. α, β1, and β2
are unknown parameters to be estimated. µ, γ, and  are country fixed effects, time fixed
effects, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively. Country fixed effects control for any
fixed effects common across countries while time dummies allow us to account for business
cycle effects.
In line with the empirical work on the finance-trade nexus, we control for the Initial
real GDP per capita, the total Population, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the Growth
rate of Terms of Trade (TOT), the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), and Inflation.
Unlike previous studies, we also control for Banking Crisis which is a dummy variable
8
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taking the value 1 for the banking crisis inception year and 0 otherwise. 6 Indeed, a recent
empirical literature establishes that banking crises exert a negative effect on international
trade flows through their effects on trade finance and economic growth (see for instance
Ronci, 2004; Iacovone & Zavacka, 2009; Chor & Manova, 2010). In Equation (1), β1 is
our coefficient of interest. This equation is estimated using both pure cross-sectional and
panel specifications. 7
Does institutional quality matter in the relationship between finance and trade ? In
order to answer this question, we specify an augmented version of Equation (1) as follows :
Tradeit = α
′
+β
′
1 ∗Financeit +β
′
2 ∗Financeit ∗Zit +β
′
3 ∗Zit +β
′
4 ∗Xit +µ
′
i + γ
′
t + 
′
it (2)
where Zit represents the institutional variable that measures the strength of the domes-
tic institutions for the country i in period t. Here, we empirically test that, β
′
2 = 0, the
coefficient on the interaction term between financial development and the institutional
variable is positive and statistically significant. The underlying assumption is that coun-
tries with strong institutions are likely to enjoy greater the positive effect of finance on
trade than countries with weak institutions. In other words, financial development, in the
presence of high-quality institutions, might lead to higher performances in international
trade. In this specification, δ = β
′
1 + β
′
2 ∗ Zit is the responsiveness of trade performance
to financial development that varies, in a linear fashion, with the institutional variable
(Zit). This specification nests the first one, Equation (1), in which the effect of finance on
trade does not depend upon institutional strength (suggesting that β
′
2 = 0 and β
′
3 = 0).
Since institutional quality tend to be strongly associated with the real income per capita,
we isolate the impact of institutions by following Francois & Manchin (2007) and use the
residuals from the regression of each measure of institutional quality on the logs of Initial
GDP per capita and total Population.
Assessing the influence of finance on trade raises a number of issues. The endoge-
neity bias is the first and potentially most important problem to be dealt with. This
problem may originate from a number of sources. First, reverse causality, running from
international trade to financial development, is a serious problem because it could lead
to a statistical bias in the estimated coefficient on financial development, with Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates exaggerating its impact on international trade. Second, our
6. The banking crisis dummy comes from Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) and Laeven & Valencia (2012)
datasets.
7. Except of institutional variables and banking crisis dummy, all variables are included in logs, so
that the results can be interpreted as elasticities.
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measure of financial development could be correlated with omitted relevant determinants
of international trade. In this case, OLS estimator could attribute the effects of these
omitted variables to financial development, suggesting a statistical bias similar to reverse
causality. Finally, endogeneity bias can arise from measurement errors in the regressor
variables. We therefore use the System GMM estimator developed by Blundell & Bond
(1998) to address these issues. 8 For this estimator, the sample period was divided into 8
nonoverlapping sub-periods as follows : 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010. 9 The instrumentation procedure was performed
so as to limit the problem of too many instruments (Roodman et al., 2009). 10 For the
lagged dependent variable, we use the first difference lagged one period as instrument in
the equations in levels, suggesting that this variable is predetermined. In the equations
in differences, we also use its first lagged value as instrument. In the same way, we use
second lagged values in levels of the other regressors as instruments in the equations in
differences and their second lagged values in differences as instruments in the equations
in levels, assuming that these variables are endogenous. 11 We use the Windmeijer (2005)
finite-sample correction to the standard errors in two-step estimation. As another issue,
it is likely that there are country unobserved characteristics that influence the pattern of
trade. The System GMM estimator also allows us to take into account this unobserved
heterogeneity.
3.2. Data and summary statistics
Our sample consists of 75 developed and developing countries over the period 1971-
2010. This subsection describes the variables and provides the summary statistics (see
Table 1).
Measure of financial development
In this study, it is assumed that there are large differences in the quality of domestic
financial systems across countries, suggesting that financial system can be viewed as an
endowment. Countries with well-functioning financial systems should tend to specialize
8. GMM stands for Generalized Method of Moments.
9. For cross-sectional specifications, for which data were collapsed into 40-year averages, we present
results from the standard OLS.
10. Too many instruments may overfit endogenous variables leading to a failure in expunging their
endogenous components.
11. The assumptions underlying this system is that there is one-order serial correlation in the diffe-
renced residual and that the instruments are exogenous. However, there should be no second-order serial
correlation in the first difference residuals. We use a number of diagnostic statistics to test for the validity
of these assumptions.
10
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in financially intensive goods. We would like measure of how countries’ financial sector
improves the firms’ ability to fulfill their need for external finance. Therefore, our measure
of financial development is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP (Domestic
credit). This measure excludes credits to central, development, and private banks, as well
as credits to the private sector by non-money banks. It is assumed to better channel the
domestic financial savings to domestic private sector. As shown in Table 1, there is wide
cross-country variation in the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP.
Measure of trade performance
Our measure of trade performance is the ratio of manufacturing exports to merchandise
exports (Manufacturing exports). The assumption underlying the use of this measure
is that manufactured goods are considered as goods with increasing returns to scale,
in line with the standard theory of international trade (see for instance chapter 6 in
Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). Indeed, industries with increasing returns to scale benefit
more from a higher level of external finance than other industries, because this allows
them to exploit scale economies (Beck, 2002). Consistent with this hypothesis, results from
Figure 1 in Appendix, shows that manufacturing exports (% of merchandise exports) is
more correlated with financial sector development than total exports (% of GDP).
Table 1 – Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Domestic credit, 1971-2010 75 51.54 35.17 7.54 170.90
M2, 1971-2010 74 60.43 42.13 17.74 177.71
Manufacturing exports, 1971-2010 75 42.51 28.08 1.33 94.15
Total Exports, 1971-2010 75 36.93 29.68 9.30 232.53
FDI, 1971-2010 75 2.16 1.82 0.07 10.70
Inflation, 1971-2010 74 22.55 60.54 1.88 353.60
Terms of trade, 1971-2010 74 106.26 17.43 81.87 166.73
Population, 1971-2010 75 5.05e+07 1.63e+08 71936 1.12e+09
ICRG, 1984-2010 70 0.61 0.21 0.29 0.99
Civil Liberties Index, 1972-2010 75 3.14 1.58 1 6.78
Polity, 1972-2010 70 3.34 6.23 -10 10
REER, 1976-2010 50 2855.53 19345.25 74.64 136910.80
Creditor Rights, 1978-2003 67 1.85 1.08 0 4
Institutional variables
As previously indicated, the relationship between financial development and international
trade can be conditional on a number of institutional parameters. In this study, we first
11
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use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator of quality of government
as an indicator of institutional quality. This composite index is the mean value of the
ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality’, scaled 0-1,
with higher values indicating better quality of government. We also use the Civil Liberties
index (CLI) from Freedom House, and the Revised Combined Polity Score (Polity) from
the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and
7 (least free) for the CLI and between -10 (strongly autocratic regime) and 10 (strongly
democratic regime) for Polity.
4. Results
4.1. The basic results
4.1.1. Does financial development affect manufacturing trade ?
Consistent with the findings of earlier empirical studies, the regression results in Table
2 show that countries with higher levels of financial development experienced higher levels
of manufacturing exports over the period 1971-2010. 12 We first control for the Initial GDP
per capita and total Population (columns 1 and 4). The Initial Domestic Credit enters
positively and significantly at conventional levels, for both OLS and System GMM esti-
mators. 13 The coefficient on Initial Domestic Credit ranged from 0.793 to 0.837 and from
0.387 to 0.591 for OLS and System GMM estimators, respectively. These results are quite
similar to those of Beck (2002) who found a coefficient on private credit of 0.572 and 0.488
for OLS and System GMM estimators, respectively. These differences can be explained by
the choice of the proxies for financial development and by the sample period used. 14 The
Initial GDP per capita does not enter significantly, with exception of results from System
GMM in column 5. Population enters positively and significantly with coefficients of 0.152
and 0.143. This suggests that, on average, the most populous countries tend to experience
higher levels of manufacturing exports than the least populous countries. However, co-
12. The diagnostic statistics are favorable. The Hansen test of overidentification, which is robust to
heteroskedasticity, does not reject the validity of instrumental variables used and the Arellano and Bond
test rejects the second order serial correlation.
13. In unreported regressions, we consider two alternative measures of financial development, namely,
the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to GDP and the ratio of the broad money stock (M2) to GDP. This
does not alter our main findings.
14. While Beck (2002) uses total private credit as a proxy for financial development, we use domestic
private credit. Furthermore, our sample period (1971-2010) is longer than that of Beck (2002) (1966-1995).
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efficients on Population become statistically insignificant when controlling for additional
factors. It is clear that controlling for FDI, the Growth rate of TOT, Inflation, and the
REER does not alter the results on the positive effect of financial development on manu-
facturing exports (columns 2 and 5). As expected, FDI exerts a positive and statistically
significant effect on manufacturing exports, irrespective of the estimation method used.
The Growth rate of TOT enters positively but its coefficient is statistically significant only
for the System GMM estimator (column 5). Inflation and the REER significantly exert
detrimental effects on exports of manufactured goods. The positive effect of financial de-
velopment on manufacturing exports holds even after controlling for Banking Crisis. As
expected, Banking Crisis exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on exports
of manufactured goods (columns 3 and 6).
The size of the coefficients on the Initial Domestic Credit implies an economically
important effect. Let’s consider the examples of the two (advanced and developing) coun-
tries, Japan and Nepal, respectively. In 1971, Nepal has a ratio of domestic private credit
to GDP of 4%, while Japan has a ratio of 124%. The results from our cross-sectional re-
gression (column 3), that provides estimates of long-run effects, suggest that, other things
equal, Nepal’s ratio of manufacturing exports would have been at least 78% over the per-
iod 1971-2010, rather than its actual 60%, if it had experienced the same initial level of
domestic private credit as Japan. Similar results were found in results from System GMM
estimator, that indicate the short-term impact. However, as in Beck (2002), the long-run
impact of financial development on manufacturing exports appears to be stronger than
its short-term impact.
4.1.2. Do Institutional factors matter much ?
In this section we discuss the hypothesis that the responsiveness of export perfor-
mance to finance depends, in a linear fashion, upon institutional quality. The regression
results from the estimation of Equation (2) are reported in Table 3. Each institutional
variable is included along with its interaction with financial development. We start with
the cross-sectional OLS regressions on the averages of all the variables over the entire
time period (columns 1-3). As before, we then present panel specifications on a sample of
nonoverlapping five-year averages using the System GMM estimator (columns 4-6). The
instrumentation was made in a way consistent with the procedure indicated in Subsec-
tion 2.1. Similarly, the interaction terms are instrumented with their second lagged values
14
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in each equation of the system. Once again, the diagnostic statistics are favorable. As
shown in Table 3, the Hansen test of overidentification does not reject the validity of ins-
trumental variables used and the Arellano and Bond test rejects the second order serial
correlation. Our results support the prediction that the responsiveness of manufacturing
trade to financial development depends on the level of institutional quality. Taking into
account these interaction terms does not alter the results on the positive impact of finance
on manufacturing exports. The coefficient on the Initial Domestic Credit is positive and
statistically significant at conventional levels. As expected, the estimated coefficients are
positive for ICRG and Polity, and negative for the CLI. For the OLS estimator, the inter-
action terms between ICRG and Policy and Initial Domestic Credit enter positively and
significantly with coefficients equal to 0.544 and 0.032, respectively (columns 1 and 3).
This suggests that the positive effect of financial sector development on manufacturing
exports is more pronounced for countries with high-quality institutions. Similar results are
found when considering the System GMM estimator (columns 4 and 6). The coefficients
on CLI and DC×CLI are each statistically insignificant for OLS estimator but the Wald
test for joint significance gives p-value equals to 0.039, suggesting that these variables are
jointly significant at 5% level.
These results imply an important economically effect of institutions on the responsive-
ness of manufacturing trade to finance. Considering the results from pure cross-sectional
specifications (columns 1-3), all other things being equal, moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile of ICRG results in 75 percentage points rise in the responsiveness of manufac-
turing trade to finance, equivalent to about 0.57 of the standard deviation of the ratio of
manufacturing exports. As for Polity, this corresponds to an increase in the responsiveness
of about 135%. Furthermore, an exogenous decrease of one point in the CLI is associated
with an increase in the responsiveness of trade to finance of about 62 percentage points.
Overall, these effects appear to be quite similar to those of the System GMM estimator
(columns 4-6).
Regarding the control variables, it is clear that the magnitude and the signs of the
coefficient estimates are consistent with those of our benchmark regressions in Table 2.
Overall, Initial GDP per capita and Population enter positively but not statistically si-
gnificant at any conventional level. On average, FDI and the Growth of TOT positively
and significantly affect manufacturing exports, although the coefficient on the latter is
only statistically significant for the System GMM estimator. In contrast, Inflation and the
16
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REER exert a negative impact on the exports of manufactured goods. As before, Banking
Crisis is found to be strongly associated with a collapse in manufacturing exports.
In sum, results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that countries with well-functioning financial
systems experience higher levels of manufacturing exports. Therefore, these countries tend
to have a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries. Furthermore, the results
on both institutional quality and its interaction with finance suggest that financial sector
development is more favorable to manufacturing exports in countries with high-quality
institutions. These results complement those of previous empirical work on the relationship
between finance and trade (see for instance Beck, 2002, 2003; Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2005;
Manova, 2008). By showing that the relationship between finance and trade depends on
the quality of institutions, this study reconciles the two opposite views in the empirical
literature on finance-trade nexus. 15
4.2. Robustness checks
In this section, we carry out three consistency checks namely the use an alternative
method dealing with the endogeneity bias, the use of an alternative measure of financial
development, and the use of an alternative measure of international trade.
4.2.1. Alternative method dealing with endogeneity : using the IV estimator
The System GMM estimator used in Subsection 4.1 has been shown to have much
better finite sample properties in terms of bias and root mean squared error (RMSE)
compared with that of Difference GMM estimator in Monte Carlo studies, especially under
certain stationarity conditions of the initial observation (see for instance Blundell & Bond,
1998; Blundell et al., 2000). However, the use of such an estimator can be problematic
with country level panel data that are characterized by highly persistent series (Bun &
Windmeijer, 2009). Although the diagnostic statistics in Tables 2 and 3 are favorable, we
need to insure that these results hold in other circumstances.
In this section, we deal with the endogeneity problem arising from reverse causality or
simultaneity bias by using a pure cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) estimator over
15. As indicated in Section 1, there is a controversial recognition of the positive association between
finance and trade. While a number of studies find that international trade is driven by financial develop-
ment (see, for instance Beck, 2002, 2003; Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2005; Becker & Greenberg, 2007; Manova,
2008), an opposite viewpoint suggests that financial development is an outcome of the supply and demand
for external finance (see for instance Huang & Temple, 2005; Klein & Olivei, 2008; Baltagi et al., 2009;
Do & Levchenko, 2007).
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the entire time period 1971-2010. We use creditor rights to extract the exogenous com-
ponent of financial sector development. The level of creditors’ rights is found to strongly
determine the level of private credit (see for instance Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al.,
2008). 16 Elsewhere, to account for the endogeneity of the interaction between financial
development and institutions, each interaction term is instrumented with the interaction
between creditor rights and the corresponding measure of institutional quality. Initial
GDP per capita is that of initial year of the period. Furthermore, the other regressors are
instrumented with their initial values. Results are presented in Table 4. In the column
1, we first present the results from the estimation of our baseline specification where the
effect of institutions on the responsiveness of trade to finance is not taken into account
(Equation 1). In Columns 2-4, we account for this effect using the three institutional va-
riables as in Table 3. It is clear that the diagnostic statistics are favorable ; the Hansen
J overidentification test (which is robust to heteroskedasticity) does not reject the vali-
dity of instrumental variables. For example, for our baseline specification in columns 1,
the Kleibergen-Paap F-test statistic indicate that the IV estimates have a bias of about
30 percent towards the corresponding OLS estimates. Similar values of this statistic are
found in columns 2-4. Once again, the initial Domestic Credit enters positively and signi-
ficantly with a coefficients of 0.746 about two times higher than that in column 6 of Table
2. Again, The size of this coefficient implies an economically strong relationship between
finance and trade, even after controlling for institutions. A 10 percent exogenous increase
in the Initial Domestic Credit is associated with an increase of more than 7 percentage
points in the ratio of manufacturing exports (column 1). As before, controlling for the role
of institutions in the finance-trade nexus does not alter this result (columns 2-4). This
yields very similar results though smaller effects of finance on trade compared with that
in columns 4-6 in Table 3. The coefficients on all interactions between financial develop-
ment and institutional quality are still significant at conventional levels of significance.
It follows that countries with higher levels of financial development experience larger ex-
ports shares in manufactured goods and that this effect is more pronounced in countries
with high-quality institutions. A two-standard deviation increase in ICRG (in Policy) is
associated with an increase of 17 (of 97) percentage points in the responsiveness of trade
to finance. Additionally, a decrease of one point in CLI is associated with an increase in
16. La Porta et al. (2008) found that a two-standard deviation increase in the creditor rights is asso-
ciated with an increase of 15 percentage points in the ratio of private credit to GDP.
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the responsiveness of trade to finance of about 10 percentage points.
Turning to the control variables, the results are broadly in line with our findings in
Tables 2 and 3. Initial GDP per capita and Population remain statistically insignificant
at any conventional level although the coefficient on the former changes its sign. As pre-
viously, FDI and the Growth rate of TOT exert a positive and statistically significant
effect on manufacturing trade, even though the coefficient on the latter is not significant
when using CLI and Policy as proxies for institutional quality (columns 3 and 4). Simi-
larly, the coefficients on Inflation, the REER, and Banking Crisis are still negative and
mostly statistically significant.
4.2.2. Alternative measures of financial development
In this Sub-section, we consider an alternative measures of financial development,
namely the ratio of broad money (M2). The use of ratio is consistent with the Mckinnon’s
outside money hypothesis, even though it does not allow us to perfectly capture the Shaw’s
debt-intermediation effect in developing countries. Indeed, in such countries the broad
money stock is essentially held outside the banking system. This indicator of financial
development has been widely used in the empirical literature on the relationship between
finance and growth (see for instance King & Levine, 1993; Caldero`n & Liu, 2003; Do &
Levchenko, 2007). As for the Domestic Credit, there is wide variation in M2 ranging from
less than 18 percent in Cameroon to more than 177 percent in Japan using data over the
period 1971-2010.
Results in Table 5 show that our basic results are robust to the use of an alternative
measure of financial development. M2 enters positively and significantly in all regressions
with a coefficient of about 0.1, suggesting a substantial economic effects. Moving from
the 25th to 75th percentile in the initial level of M2 raises the share in the merchandise
exports of manufactured goods by 16 percentage points, or about 2 standard deviations
of the ratio of manufacturing exports. Once again, this result holds when conditioning the
finance-trade nexus on institutional quality. With the exception of the interaction between
M2 and ICRG, all coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant. These
interactions enter with the expected signs. While ICRG and Policy positively affect the
responsiveness of trade to finance, the corresponding effect of CLI is negative.
Furthermore, using M2 as proxy for financial sector development does not alter the
results on control variables. As before, the coefficients on the Initial GDP per capita and
20
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Population are not statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. FDI
enters positively and significantly but the coefficient on Growth rate of TOT is no longer
statistically significant. The results on Inflation, the REER, and Banking Crisis are very
similar to the previous ones.
4.2.3. Alternative measure of international trade
In this subsection, we use Total Exports, defined as the ratio of total exports (the sum
of exports of goods and services) to GDP as an alternative trade indicator. The results
in Table 1 indicate that there is significant variation in Total Exports across countries in
our sample. This ratio is ranged from 9.30 percent in United States to 232.53 percent in
Singapore over the period 1971 to 2010.
The results in Table 6 indicate that our baseline results are robust to the use of the
ratio of total exports to GDP as an alternative measure of international trade. Once
again, the Initial Domestic Credit enters positively and significantly at the conventional
levels for both OLS and System GMM estimators, even after controlling for the effect of
institutional quality on the responsiveness of trade to finance. On average, the coefficient
on the Initial Domestic Credit is smaller than that in Tables 2 and 3, suggesting that
countries with well-developed financial systems tend to have a comparative advantage in
manufacturing industries. 17 This is consistent with the results in Figure 1 in appendix.
As previously, results on the interactions between financial development and institutional
quality indicate that countries with high-quality institutions enjoy greater the positive
impact of finance on trade than countries with low-quality institutions. In addition, with
exception of Population, the results on the control variables hold when using Total Exports
as an alternative measure of international trade. The coefficient on Population becomes
negative and statistically significant even after controlling for institutional quality.
In sum, the regression results in Tables 4-6 shows that our baseline findings are robust
to a number of sensitivity tests. It is also clear that our results hold when using an
alternative estimation method to deal with the endogeneity, and when using alternative
measures of financial development and international trade.
17. This comparison was made using standardized estimated coefficients.
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5. Concluding comments
This paper investigates the effects of financial sector development on manufacturing
trade, using a sample of 75 countries over the period 1971-2010. Using both cross-sectional
and panel specifications, as well as appropriate estimation methods, our results indicate
that financial development exerts a strong and robust impact on manufacturing trade. On
average, countries with better-developed financial sectors are found to have higher levels
of exports of manufactured goods. Interestingly, financial development has a greater effect
on manufacturing exports in the presence of high-quality institutions. By using System
GMM estimator as an alternative method, it is apparent that these results are not driven
by reverse causality or simultaneity bias.
Our results suggest that there is another favorable impact of financial sector develop-
ment on economic development beyond its positive impact on economic growth, namely
its positive effect on manufacturing exports. As policy implications, economic policies that
promote financial sector development should rather be used to boost exports of manu-
factured goods and to reduce current account deficits than exchange rate manipulations.
This is particularly the case in countries with high-quality institutions. In this study, we
consider aggregate data of international trade. This does not allow us to take into account
the geographical determinants of trade. However, a growing body of literature emphasizes
the importance of these geographic factors in international trade (see for instance Frankel
& Romer, 1999). Future work needs to deepen these findings by using bilateral data that
will allow one to properly take into account these geographical determinants.
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Appendix
Figure 1 – Finance and Exports, simple cross-country correlations
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List of countries Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Bolivia, Ca-
nada, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland,
France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea. Rep., Kuwait, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicara-
gua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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